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Katz: Parent and Child--Right of Minor Child to Sue Parent for Personal
WEST VIRGINIA LAW QUARTERLY
reads: "An insurer... .against liability from loss ....
cannot
escape liability under a condition contained therein to the effect
that it shall not be liable if such accident occurs while the truck is
being operated by any person under the age of sixteen years, except it establish the relation of principal and agent as between
the assured and the party, under the age of sixteen years, who is
claimed to have been operating. ... " Under this syllabus, in
order for the insurance company to escape liability under any state
of facts, it must establish agency between the insured and the
operator. Certainly neither the insured nor the insurer contemplated liability because of the operation of the car by totally unauthorized persons under the age of sixteen years. How could the
assured himself be liable ?' It is difficult to find any reason whatsoever for putting this decision on the grounds of agency. It
seems to be purely the construction of a word in an insurance contract. This syllabus, if literally followed, might lead the court far
afield. It may be that the result is desirable but the steps by
which it is attained are unsubstantial indeed.
-ROBERT

E.

STEAT Y.

PARENT AND CILD--RIGHT OF MiwR CHILD TO SUE PARENT

TORT.-The plaintiff, an unemancipated child of sixteen, residing with her father, the defendant, was injured in an
automobile accident while a passenger in her father's automobile,
driven by him. She sued him for damages, alleging negligent
driving of the car by her father.
Held: No recovery since an unemancipated infant may not
maintain against his parents an action for personal injuries caused
by the parent's negligence in driving his automobile wherein the
child was a passenger. Securo v. Securo.1
In this case the West Virginia Court has spoken for the first
time on the right of a minor child to sue his parent for personal
tort. In refusing such an action the court follows the great weight
of authority in the United States.' The Supreme Court of South
FOR PERSONAL

'Hossley v. Union Indemnity Co., 137 Miss. 537, 102 So. 561 (1924);
BLrsHur
, AUTOMOBILE LAW (1927) 2642.
156 S. E. 750 (W. Va. 1931).
Small v. Morrison, 185 N. 0. 577, 118 S. E. 12 (1923); Materese v.
Materese, 47 R. I. 131, 131 Ati. 198 (1925); Elias v. Collins, 237 Mich. 175,
211 N. W. 88 (1926); MeKelvey v. McKelvey, 111 Tenn. 388. 77 S. W. 664
(1923); Fortinbury v. Holmes, 89 Miss. 373, 42 So. 799 (1907); Goldstein v.
1
2
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Carolina adopted the same rule on a similar state of facts in the
recent case of Kelly v. Kelly.3 The court, in a brief opinion, declared the rule well settled that an unemancipated child cannot
sue his parent in tort, citing the many authorities to this effect.
In many of the cases considered' the parent is charged with negligence in the operation of the automobile in which the minor child
was riding at the time of the injury, as in the Securo case.
The West Virginia Court in the Securo case refused the action
on the ground that society has an interest in preserving harmony in
domestic relations, and in not permitting families to be torn
asunder by suits for damages by insolent and ungrateful children,
for real or fancied grievances.
It has been urged that to permit such an action would be interfering with parental control and discipline; disturbing domestic
tranquility.' Some courts have refused such an action because it
would encourage fraud and be directly opposed to the economic
identity of parent and child.' The controlling reason assigned for
the established rule in all cases is well summed up in the Wisconsin case of Wick v. Wick."
No case directly opposed to the view of Securo v. Securo as to
negligent wrongs has been found. Ho-*ever, many strong dissenting opinions have been expressed in the cases." It is contended that
the change of times and the common practice of carrying insurance to protect against civil consequences of negligence justifies
modification of the common law rule, despite the consideration of
Goldstein, 4 N. J. Misc. R. 711, 134 Atl. 184 (1926); Zutter v. O'Connell
(Wis.) 299 N. W. 74 (1930); Mesite v. Kirchenstein, 109 Conn. 77, 145 Atl.
753 (1929); Damiano v. Damiano, 6 N. J. Misc. R. 849, 143 Atl. 3 (1928);
Ciani v. Ciani, 215 N. Y. S. 767, 127 Misc. Rep. 304 (1926); Mannion v.
Mannion, 3 N. J. Misc. R. 68, 129 Atl. 431 (1925); Hewlett v. George, 68
Miss. 703, 9 So. 885 (1891); Wick v. Wick, 192 Wis. 260, 212 N. W. 787
(1927); Taubert v. Taubert, 103 Minn. 247, 114 N. W. 763 (1908); Smitfi
v. Smith, 81 Ind. App. 566, 142 N. E. 128 (1924); Roller v. Roller, 37 Wash.
242, 79 Pac. 788 (1905).
3155 S. E. 888 (S. 0. 1930).
Ciani v. Ciani, Materese v. Materese, Wick v. Wick, supra n. 2.
Wick v. Wick, Materese v. Materese, Small v. Morrison, .supra n. 2.
'37 Wash. 242, 79 Pac. 788 (1905).
"To question the authority of the parent or to encourage the disobedience
of the child is to impair the peace and happiness of the family and undermine the wholesome influence of the home. To permit the child to maintain an
action in tort is to introduce discord and contention where the laws of nature
have established peace and obedience."
8See dissenting opinions in Wick v. Wick, sitpra n. 2; Dunlop v. Dunlop, 150
AtL. 905 (N. H. 1930).
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public policy invoked in support of the rule by the majority. An
infant's personal rights, they say, are as sacred as his property
rights, yet an action is permitted in the latter and not the former
instance. The "domestic tranquility" argument is over-ridden
by modern concepts of individual rights and remedies. Insurance
is nation-wide. A man need not think less of his own flesh and
blood than of his employee's or the stranger on the highway. Insurance, the writer believes, is the real basis for the dissenting
views.
A Canadian case, Ifarc1and v. Marchiand' involved a successful tort action by a child against its parent under statute. Text
writers have said there is no rule of common law to prevent such
an action being brought by the child against its parent for personal injury'
The case of Dunlap v. Dunlap," decided by the New Hampshire Court, is important because here the meaning of "emancipation" was stretched to permit a minor child to recover from an
Employer's Liability Insurance Fund when injured while working for his father, who was also his employer. While the court
did not have before it the case of an "unemancipated" child, it
did, nevertheless, go into a lengthy discussion of what it believed
the "fallacious majority rule."'
Most courts have extended this disability to sue to intentional wrongs, such as rape by the father upon his daughter,'3
false imprisonment and malicious assault." The writer believes
this extends the rule too far. The reasons for the rule no longer
apply. The family tranquility no longer needs safeguarding. The
parent has ended it. The New Hampshire court has allowed an
action for an intentional wrong.?
Would the West Virginia
027 Rev. Leg. (Canada) 254 (1923).
20 EVERSLEY, DOMESTIC RELATIONS (4th ed. 1926) 571.
Judge Cooley favored recovery by the infant. COOLEY ON TORTS (3rd ed. 1906) 771.
2BSupra n. 8.
1"The parent has escaped liability because it has been thought that a
right of recovery would lead to worse results. The child has been sacrificed
for the family good. Argument is not needed to sustain the thesis that such
a proposition be limited to cases clearly within the reason for the rule."
" Roller v. Roller, supra. n. 2.
" Hewlett v. George, supra n. 2.
0
Zebrik v. Razmus, 81 N. H. 45, 124 At. 460 (1923).
An able discussion of the entire subject is found in an article by Professor
McCurdy, Torts Between Persons in Domestic Relations (1930) 43 HARV. L.
REV. 1030, 1056.
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Court follow the New Hampshire decision?
the West Virginia Court said:

In the Securo case

"But whether the rule should be carried to the extent, as
some of the cases have done, of denying the infant a right to
maintain an action for damages against his parent for injury
inflicted with evil intention and from wicked motives is a
question not now before us but remains for consideration if
such unfortunate situation should arise."
-JEROME KATZ.

REAL PROPERTY-USE OF "DESCEND"
IN DEED-WORD OF
February 19, 1868, Matthew L. Ward and wife
conveyed a certain tract of land to "Lewis Woolwine (for the use
and benefit of Columbia, his wife and upon her decease to descend
to her heirs)." Columbia Woolwine thereafter conveyed parcels
of the land in fee simple, and, through mesne conveyances, those
lands come to A. S. Bosworth and Nellie A. Maxwell, among others.
In November, 1928, Columbia Woolvine died and thereafter her
heirs brought a bill for partition, claiming that they had a fee
simple interest as remainder-men. Held: The deed from Matthew
L. Ward and wife to Lewis Woolwine operated to vest in Columbia
Woolwine an equitable fee simple estate, and the heirs took
nothing as remaindermen. Trahternv. Woolwine.1
It would seem that the phrase "to Lewis Woolwine for the
use and benefit of Columbia, his wife" gave Columbia Woolwine
an equitable fee simple,2 unless the words following were intended
to limit or qualify such an interest: "and upon her decease to
descend to her heirs."
The Court said that the latter phrase did
not limit or qualify the fee, but was merely descriptive of the fee,
i. e., an estate which would descend to the heirs of Columbia Woolwine at her decease. That construction rests upon the theory that
the grantor used the word "descend" in its technical sense, as
meaning "to pass by succession." It is doubtful, however, that the
word was not used in its technical sense, for there are apparently
other and better words to show an intent to pass a fee, and least of
all would one expect a conveyancer to express such an intent i
such an awkward way. Of course, if "descend" was used technically, Columbia Woolwine took a fee simple and her heirs took
nothing.
LIMITATION.-On

1155 S. E. 909 (W. Va. 1930).
2

W. VA. REV. CODE (1931) c. 36, art. 1, § 11; W. VA. CODE ANN. (Barnes,
1923) c. 71, § 8
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